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A VISUAL GUIDE TO NFIB v. SEBELIUS
COMPETING COMMERCE CLAUSE OPINION LINES 1789-2012

MAP EXPLANATION
Though Chief Justice Roberts ultimately provided
the fifth vote upholding the Affordable Care Act
(ACA) under the Tax Power in National Federation
of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566
(2012), his was also one of five votes finding the
ACA exceeded Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause.
While Roberts argued that the ACA’s purported
exercise of Commerce power “finds no support in our
precedent,” Id. at 2590, Justice Ginsburg accused the
Chief Justice of failing to “evaluat[e] the
constitutionality of the minimum coverage provision
in the manner established by our precedents.” Id. at
2618 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
These conflicting perspectives on “precedent” might
prompt observers to ask whether Roberts and
Ginsburg considered the same cases as controlling.
This Visual Guide shows that though the justices
agreed on relevant cases, they disagreed on which
opinions within those cases properly stated the law.
Both Roberts and Ginsburg implicitly adopted the
reasoning of prior dissents and concurrences as well
as majority opinions. The map illustrates how
competing lines of Commerce Clause opinions
constitute a long-running doctrinal dialectic that
culminated – for now – in NFIB v. Sebelius.
Note: This map is not the territory. This Guide does
not purport to represent every case in the Commerce
Clause dialectic. Rather, it highlights representative
and influential opinions that define the basic
genealogy of the current doctrinal debate.

COMPETING LINES IN NFIB
Roberts relied on the majority tradition of Morrison
and Lopez as anticipated by Rehnquist in his Hodel
concurrence. His understanding of the limits of
Commerce power traces back to Cardozo’s
admonitions in Schechter and Carter Coal and is
consonant with O’Connor’s dissent in Raich.
Ginsburg relied on the majority tradition running
from Raich back to Heart of Atlanta, Wickard, and
Darby. Her vision of a strong Commerce power
traces back to Holmes’ expansive view of the
Commerce Clause expressed in his Hammer dissent
and is consonant with the dissents in Lopez and
Morrison.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (9-0).
Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion upholding
Congressional power to regulate navigable waters is
the foundation of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Both sides in the ACA debate claim fidelity to
Marshall’s vision.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (5-4).
The majority struck down a federal law prohibiting
the interstate sale of goods produced by child labor.
Though typical of pre-1937 doctrine, Justice Holmes
wrote a prescient and blistering dissent that promoted
a vision of strong federal power.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (9-0).
Usually recalled as a nondelegation case, Schechter
also struck down provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act for exceeding Commerce power. In his
concurrence, Justice Cardozo articulated a pragmatic
view of the limits on Commerce power.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (63).
The majority struck down a federal law regulating
production and labor relations in the coal industry.
Justice Cardozo dissented and argued the law
conformed to the pragmatic limits on Commerce
power he advocated in Schechter.
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (5-4).
Reversing the prior majority pattern of striking down
New Deal legislation, Chief Justice Hughes’ majority
opinion upheld the National Labor Relations Act
against a Commerce challenge. (Justice Roberts
similarly “switched” his view in this case decided
exactly two weeks after West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).). Both sides in the
ACA debate implicitly claim fidelity to Hughes’
opinion, which marks the beginning of modern
Commerce jurisprudence.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (9-0).
A unanimous Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and overruled Hammer. Justice Stone’s
opinion specifically cited Holmes’ Hammer dissent
and stated that Carter Coal had been abrogated.

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (9-0).
The unanimous Court upheld the federal
government’s power to regulate wheat grown for
purely personal use under the Commerce Clause.
Justice Jackson’s opinion represents the strongest
view of federal Commerce power and is a bedrock
case for ACA proponents.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (9-0).
Justice Clark’s opinion for a unanimous Court upheld
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a Commerce
Clause challenge. The strong Commerce tradition
remained unopposed.
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (9-0).
The Court unanimously upheld the Surface Mining
Act against a Commerce challenge. Justice
Marshall’s majority opinion articulated a typically
strong understanding of federal power. Then Justice
Rehnquist, however, only concurred in judgment and
invoked Cardozo’s opinions in Schechter and Carter
Coal to suggest that pragmatic limits on Commerce
power needed recognition. His opinion sets the stage
for contemporary Commerce debate.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (5-4).
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority
struck down the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act
as beyond Commerce Power. Rehnquist implicitly
adopted his approach from his concurrence in Hodel.
In dissent, Justices Breyer and Souter appealed to the
older line of cases like Wickard and Heart of Atlanta.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (54).
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion built on
Lopez and struck down a portion of the Violence
Against Women Act. Justice Souter invoked his prior
dissent from Lopez. The dialectic was in full swing.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (5-4).
Although a majority upheld the federal government’s
power to criminalize personal cultivation of medical
marijuana, only four justices joined Stevens’ plurality
opinion (Justice Scalia concurred in judgment only).
In dissent, Justice O’Connor invoked the LopezMorrison counter tradition.
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